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Discourses on rights, duties and obligations predominantly take 
place within the context of constitutional, administrative and 
human rights law. In the last decade these debates have also 
begun to take place in international investment law, an 
"autonomous branch" of international law. The main debate 
centres on the adequacy and sustainability of investor-centred 
regulatory regimes which provide more rights than obligations to 
investors. The 2006 Southern African Development Community 
Finance and Investment Protocol (SADC FIP) was a typical 
example of such a regime. It offered antiquated protections 
which were characteristic of first generation Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs). The result was that some countries, such as 
South Africa, opted not to conform to this binding instrument, 
which did not match their progressive vision of foreign 
investment. It is against this backdrop that the SADC FIP was 
recently amended. The amendment, balances the rights and 
obligations of investors and state parties to some degree, and 
moves towards sustainable foreign investment. However, this 
paper argues that more still needs to be done to modernise the 
document in line with more recent trends.  
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1  Introduction 
The end of the Second World War (WW2) paved the way for a new era built 
on the principle of international co-operation.1 Over time this co-operation 
would take specific forms such as the United Nations (UN) and the 
European Coal and Steel Community (the modern-day European Union).2 
On the legal front, international law evolved from functioning mainly as a 
tool for mutual deterrence to an instrument promoting co-operation and 
coordination.3 In the context of international trade, apart from the 
emergence of new global governance institutions such as the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), this era witnessed the signing of treaties such as the 
General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
Among the more prominent agreements to grace the international trade 
scene are regional trade agreements (RTAs). Some RTAs are special in 
that they not only deal with the issue of integrating trade, but they also cover 
investment regulation.4 This is important because of the symbiotic 
relationship between trade and investment.5 As these instruments address 
key issues, they have multiplied across the globe. 
In Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
is the most prominent regional organisation. This organisation was 
developed in terms of the Southern African Development Community Treaty 
(SADC Treaty), with the purpose inter-alia of promoting the free flow of 
capital through improving the investment climate and enhancing co-
operation.6 
                                            
  Tinashe Kondo. BCom LLB LLM (University of the Western Cape). LLD candidate, 
University of the Western Cape. Associate Lecturer, Mercantile Law Department, 
University of the Western Cape. Email: tkondo@uwc.ac.za. I acknowledge the input 
of Nyasha Noreen Katsenga, Obdiah Mawodza and Bethsheba Kangwa, who 
provided helpful comments. Special thanks are also extended to the two peer 
reviewers who provided insightful feedback. 
1  McGowan, Cornelissen and Nel Power, Wealth and Global Equity 152. 
2  OECD International Regulatory Co-operation 65-66. 
3  Laos Foundations of Cultural Diplomacy 17. 
4 Gazzini and Brabandere International Investment Law 61. 
5  As noted by Price, "trade and investment flows are interdependent". See Price 1993 
Int'l Law 727. 
6  Preamble of the SADC Treaty. The SADC consists of 15 Member States, namely: 
Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, the 
United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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Foreign investment in the SADC region is regulated under the SADC FIP.7 
This is a legally binding and internationally recognised document that 
creates rights and obligations for all Member States and investors.8 The 
investor rights established in this document are of an international nature 
and cannot be unilaterally amended at a domestic level.9 
In recent times the SADC FIP has been amended, giving rise to interesting 
discussions on the contents of the document. It is against this background 
that this article evaluates the efficacy of these changes. The paper argues 
that, for the most part, the changes made to the SADC FIP are vital in 
balancing the rights and obligations of investors and host states. However, 
the article adopts the view that more still needs to be done in order to align 
the contents of the document with best practice. 
The article is structured as follows. Firstly, the practical challenges of the 
2006 SADC FIP are furnished. Secondly, an analytic comparison of the key 
provisions in the 2006 SADC FIP and the 2016 SADC FIP is made. Finally, 
the key issues are summarised and the findings are furnished. The paper 
suggests that: (1) the definition of investors in the 2006 SADC FIP be re-
adopted; (2) the fair and equitable clause be returned, albeit in a qualified 
form, (3) the transparency clause be extended to investors and their home 
States; (4) the optimal use of natural resources clause be aligned to 
sustainable development; (5) investor-state arbitration be re-introduced, but 
as an option of last resort after all domestic avenues have been exhausted; 
(6) the investor liability clause be expanded; and (7) a clause on physical 
security be introduced. 
2  Practical challenges of the 2006 SADC FIP 
The fast pace of international investment law constantly requires investment 
policies to adapt and accommodate newer trends. For example, in the 
1960s it was necessary for an investment regime to be based largely on 
BITs. Not so long after it was also important for a state to conclude Regional 
Trade and Investment Agreements (RTIAs) which focus on regional 
integration and economic growth. Today, in addition to BITs and RTIAs, 
states also have to conclude investment contracts and create domestic 
investment codes making provision for laws relating to foreign investments. 
                                            
7  All Member States signed the SADC FIP in 2006. It was subsequently ratified in 2010 
by a two-thirds majority.  
8  The SADC FIP gives practical implementation to the SADC Treaty. 
9  Trade and Investment Parliamentary Committee 2015 http://pmg-assets.s3-website-
eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/150922Summary_of_Matrix.pdf. 
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The content of these investment policies is equally vital. This is because 
most investment provisions are biased in favour of the investor and restrict 
policy space for the host-state.10 This is especially true in the case of first 
generation BITs, which provide for investor protection without investor 
obligations and also lack policy space for the host-state.11 The effect of this 
in some cases is that the host state is exposed to large claims when it 
attempts to implement domestic measures in conflict with the biased 
investment provisions.12 
The 2006 SADC FIP was based on first-generation BITs which have 
outlived their usefulness. These BITs provide more investor rights than they 
provide investor obligations or the rights of the state. The effect was that the 
2006 SADC FIP contained less policy space for domestic states. In recent 
times the need for policy space has taken centre stage. Many countries 
such as South Africa, India and Australia are now focussing on having 
socially responsive investment regimes which can advance the agenda of 
sustainable development.13 The SADC FIP had been lacking in this regard, 
to a degree. 
While the 2006 SADC FIP provided for enlightened clauses such as 
corporate responsibility, the optimal use of national resources, 
environmental measures and the right to regulate, this had still been far from 
what is anticipated in newer international investment agreements (IIAs). As 
an example, the Southern African Development Community Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (SADC Model BIT) also includes more progressive 
provisions such as the right of the state to pursue developmental goals14 
and the minimum standards for human rights, the environment and labour.15 
Although the 2006 SADC FIP touched on some of these concepts, they 
                                            
10  Grear and Kotzé Research Handbook on Human Rights and the Environment 493. 
11  Skovgaard Poulsen Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy 89. 
12  Up to 2014, a total of 608 cases had been brought for investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS). Of these 43% were decided in favour of the host state, 31% in 
favour of the investor and 27% were settled. See EFILA 2015 http://efila.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/EFILA_in_response_to_the-
criticism_of_ISDS_final_draft.pdf. 
13  South Africa has enacted the Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015, which is 
expected to come into force towards the end of 2017. It has also served notices to 
terminate most of its existing BITs. India is also moving to terminate its existing BITs 
and has already sent notifications to this effect. For those treaties that are expiring, 
India has requested the other parties to renegotiate so as to clarify existing 
ambiguities. India also released a new Model BIT in 2015, which will serve as the 
basis for future negotiations. Australia has made a hard exit out of the ISDS system. 
All future BITs and RTIAs it engages in will no longer include investor-state 
arbitration. 
14  Article 21 of the SADC Model BIT. 
15  Article 15 of the SADC Model BIT. 
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were not put forward expressly.16 It provided generic rights and obligations 
as opposed to future-looking balanced rights and obligations. 
As a result, some states (such as South Africa) chose to apply the SADC 
Model BIT in the development of their domestic laws, despite their 
constitutional and international obligations to honour the commitments in 
the SADC FIP. Woolfery asserts that the 2006 SADC FIP was inconsistent 
with the more favourable SADC Model BIT.17 This was because, as 
discussed earlier, it contained a number of BIT-style provisions which were 
inconsistent with the SADC Model BIT.18 For instance, the SADC Model BIT 
recommends against the inclusion of a provision on fair and equitable 
treatment and opts instead for an alternative formulation of the provision on 
fair administrative treatment, if it is deemed necessary to include this 
clause.19 
Further to the above, Member States were unclear about their commitments 
derived from the SADC FIP and their legal implications. According to the 
SADC FIP Baseline Project Report prepared by the Finmark Trust, only 
53.4% of the country-level commitments of the FIP had been realised.20 
As a result of the challenges of the 2006 SADC FIP, there was therefore a 
need to amend the document.21 A new SADC FIP was tabled to the Council 
of Ministers and adopted on the 14th of August 2015. The parties signed to 
these changes on the 31st of August 2016.22 This document is now in force 
but was released to the public only on the 16th of May 2017.23 
                                            
16  See the commentary on art 21 of the SADC FIP. 
17  Woolfrey 2014 https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/5358-is-an-overhaul-of-
the-sadc-protocol-on-finance-and-investment-imminent.html. 
18  Woolfrey 2014 https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/5358-is-an-overhaul-of-
the-sadc-protocol-on-finance-and-investment-imminent.html. 
19  Article 5 of the SADC Model BIT. 
20  SADC, GIZ and Finmark Trust 2011 http://www.finmark.org.za/sites//wp-
content/uploads/pubs/Broch_FIP0312.pdf. Of the remaining percentage, 8.4% 
represents commitments in the process of being realised, while the rest remains 
unrealised. It is important to note the disclaimer that this study is based on desktop 
research. 
21  The new FIP was tabled to the Council of Ministers at the end of 2015. The new FIP 
contains newer trends such as state-state arbitration and moves away from the 
problematic provisions in the old FIP, which were based on old-generation BITs. See 
Trade and Investment Parliamentary Committee 2015 http://pmg-assets.s3-website-
eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/150922Summary_of_Matrix.pdf. 
22  The amendments required the adoption by three-quarters of the Member States that 
are a party to the SADC FIP. Such adoption has already taken place. This 
information was supplied and confirmed in an email by Shubi Mukarasi and Thembi 
Langa from the SADC. 
23  See Southern African Development Community Agreement Amending Annex 1 (Co-
operation on Investment) of the Protocol on Finance and Investment (2015). 
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The next section of this article critically assesses the differences between 
the 2006 SADC FIP and the 2015 SADC FIP. In doing so, the positives and 
short-comings of such changes are discussed. As will be noted in that 
section, many of the changes were those proposed by South Africa. These 
were on limiting the definition of investment, elaborating on the 
determination of the value of a property on expropriation, clarifying the text 
to provide for a clear and substantive provision on national treatment, 
redefining the right to regulate, and removing international arbitration as a 
measure for resolving investor-state disputes.24 
3  An analytic comparison of the 2006 SADC FIP and the 
2016 SADC FIP 
3.1  Common provisions: the definition of "investors" and 
"investments" 
In most International Investment Agreements (IIAs), the definitions clause 
is an important provision.25 It usually contains essential definitions that 
define the application of the treaty. This has important implications for the 
host state. For instance, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) notes that how these definitions are given has an 
impact on a country's potential exposure to investor-state claims.26 This has 
seen recent agreements attempting to restrict the scope of these definitions, 
so as to limit the risk of claims from investors. At the centre of this debate 
have been two key definitions: "investment" and "investor".27 These 
definitions will now be discussed in the context of the SADC FIP.28 
When defining an investor, three options are generally employed. These are 
an enterprise-based definition, a closed-list asset-based definition, and an 
open-list asset-based definition. The significance of which definition is 
employed in a treaty relates to the scope of the provision.29 These 
definitions will now be presented from the most narrowly drafted to the most 
broadly drafted. 
An enterprise-based definition is the narrowest option for defining an 
investment. It requires the establishment or acquisition of an enterprise for 
                                            
24  PMG 2016 http://pmg.org.za/files/150922summary.pdf. 
25  Horn Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes 201. 
26  UNCTAD 2012 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf xi. 
27  See generally Gwynn Power in the International Investment Framework 92. 
28  While one could also discuss the temporal and geographic scope, the main debate 
has been about the assets and persons which find protection under an agreement. 
29  Salacuse Law of Investment Treaties 162. 
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the purpose of making a foreign investment.30 The definition then lists the 
assets of the investor that are covered because they form part of the 
enterprise. This illustrative list is not the test for investment, however, but 
rather an illustration of the types of assets of the investor which are covered 
by the treaty.31 
A closed-list asset-based definition is an intermediate approach to defining 
an investment. This definition is similar to the enterprise-based definition in 
part. This is because when it was developed it was envisaged as an 
enterprise-based definition in the United States-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).32 Over time, however, the definition evolved into its 
current form as reflected in Article 1139 of NAFTA and recent BITs. It now 
provides a closed list which "starts from an enterprise approach, but 
expands this to include assets such as intellectual property rights, whether 
or not they are associated with an existing enterprise in the Host State".33 
An open-list asset-based definition provides for the broadest coverage. The 
definition is characterised by the use of broad language such as "every kind 
of asset" or "every kind of investment", followed by a non-exhaustive list of 
the investments covered.34 This approach is more favourable to investors 
and less predictable for host states.35 This is because arbitral tribunals can 
interpret this definition widely to include assets not usually considered to be 
investments.36 The lack of limitations in this definition is therefore its biggest 
challenge.37 Notwithstanding, this has been the most widely adopted 
definition in first-generation BITs.38 
The 2006 SADC FIP provided for a wide definition of investment. This was 
attributed to the open-list asset-based definition of investment that was 
furnished in the document. The result was that most assets were covered 
                                            
30  Commentary of art 2 of the SADC Model BIT. 
31  Commentary of art 2 of the SADC Model BIT. 
32  UNCTAD 2007 http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf. 
33  Commentary of art 2 of the SADC Model BIT. 
34  Legum 2005 https://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/ 
36370461.pdf. 
35  Commentary of art 2 of the SADC Model BIT. 
36  Van Duzer, Simons and Mayeda Integrating Sustainable Development 50. Also see 
Tabari Lex Petrolea and International Investment Law 105. 
37  It is important to note that in some BITs, however, investments have been limited to 
those made in accordance with the domestic law of the host state or those that have 
been duly registered in the host state. See Dunning and Gugler Foreign Direct 
Investment 252. 
38  Brown Commentaries on Select Model Investment Treaties 600. 
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as investments. This definition has been widely used in most SADC BITs.39 
For example, the Zimbabwe-Netherlands BIT provides a definition that 
includes the wording "every kind of asset".40 This is in contrast to the 
narrower definitions, such as the closed-list asset-based definition41 and the 
enterprise-based definition, which could have been used in the alternative.42 
The 2016 SADC FIP resolves this challenge. An enterprise-based definition 
proposed by South Africa replaces the open-list asset-based definition.43 
The provision is drawn almost verbatim from the enterprise-based definition 
in the SADC Model BIT.44 It defines investment as an enterprise 
established, acquired or expanded by an investor of one state party in the 
territory of another state party.45 A non-exhaustive list of assets of the 
enterprise is also provided. The importance of this definition is that it 
reduces the scope of the previous definition and increases precision by 
covering assets only when they are part of the assets of an enterprise.46 
This precision is important in the developing country context of the SADC, 
where the thrust should be towards sustainable development and 
investment. 
Similarly, "investor" was widely defined in the 2006 SADC FIP. An investor 
is classified as "a person that has been admitted to make or has made an 
investment".47 Herein, a person is defined as a natural or juristic person.48 
The implication of this definition was that even investors from countries 
other than those of the State Parties were covered by the 2006 SADC FIP 
as long as they had been admitted to make an investment or had made an 
investment. Furthermore, the definition left some important issues 
unresolved. For instance, it did not address the issue of natural persons who 
have dual citizenship or companies that are not in effect managed in the 
                                            
39  See the commentary on art 2 of the SADC Model BIT. Investors tend to prefer an 
asset-based definition as it affords them wider protection. 
40  Article 1(1) of the Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
(1996) (Zimbabwe-Netherlands BIT).  
41  The asset-based definition provides a closed list of assets which can be deemed as 
investments. 
42  The enterprise-based definition is the narrowest definition detailing the assets which 
may be owned by an enterprise. See the commentary on art 2 of the SADC Model 
BIT for a detailed discussion. 
43  PMG 2016 http://pmg.org.za/files/150922summary.pdf. 
44  Article 2 of the SADC Model BIT. 
45  Article 1 of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
46  For the most part, the assets covered in the enterprise-based definition are similar 
to those covered in an open-list asset-based definition. 
47  Article 1 of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP. 
48  The definition of a company is also provided in Article 1 of Annex 1 of the SADC FIP. 
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country of incorporation. This created uncertainties as to whether these dual 
citizens or companies effectively managed in another country could be 
classified as investors. 
The 2016 SADC FIP narrows the definition of an investor. An investor is 
viewed only as "a natural or a juridical person of another State Party, in 
accordance with the laws and regulations of the State Party in which the 
investment is made".49 This means that investors who do not originate from 
a SADC country are no longer covered under the SADC FIP. The new 
investor definition limits the usefulness of the SADC FIP. This is because 
for the most part investment in the SADC comes from investors from other 
countries rather than from SADC investors.50 As a result, the SADC FIP, 
extends protection to the investors who least need it. In addition, the 
definition also goes against the recommendation by South Africa that all 
foreign investments from any state be covered, subject to the condition that 
a dispute between an investor and a member state be adjudicated in terms 
of the domestic law of such a state.51 Furthermore, the definition does not 
resolve outstanding issues in the previous definition on the treatment of dual 
nationals and companies managed in effect in other jurisdictions. 
3.2  Investor rights post-establishment 
3.2.1  Treatment 
Non-discrimination has become one of the key protections afforded to 
investors in the treaty system. The general thrust of this principle is that 
states cannot discriminate among investors on the basis of their 
nationality.52 In international investment law, non-discrimination is often 
exemplified in the national treatment and most-favoured nation (MFN) 
treatment standards.53 These treatment standards will now be discussed. 
A standard provision of MFN treatment was provided for in the 2006 SADC 
FIP.54 It stated that foreign investors may be afforded no less favourable 
treatment than that which is accorded investors of any other third state.55 
The practical consequence of the clause was that it placed investors from 
different countries in a host state on the same level. This is, however, 
                                            
49  Article 2 of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
50  Laryea and Laeven Principles of Household Debt Restructuring 7. 
51  PMG 2016 http://pmg.org.za/files/150922summary.pdf. 
52  Dimopoulos EU Foreign Investment Law 155. 
53  Kläger "Fair and Equitable Treatment" 188. 
54  Steger Redesigning the World Trade Organization. 
55  Article 6(2) of Annex 1 of 2006 the SADC FIP. 
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subject to the exceptions in Article 7(1) of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP.56 
Notably, however, the 2006 SADC FIP did not clarify whether MFN 
treatment is applicable to both pre-establishment and post-establishment. 
This was important as it would determine what rights are afforded to 
investors. 
The 2016 SADC FIP does not contain an MFN clause. This is in line with 
the recommendation by South Africa that the MFN clause be replaced by a 
more substantive national treatment clause.57 While the MFN clause was 
important because it prevented distortions from country-country 
liberalisation58 and also guarded against poor draftsmanship, it also brought 
with it challenges. For instance, it was not clear how the MFN clause should 
be interpreted or how far its obligations extended. As a case in point, one 
can note the vagueness on the issue of whether or not the MFN clause 
could be interpreted as applying to dispute settlement.59 Furthermore, the 
MFN clause allowed investors to capture benefits granted to other investors 
in other treaties in a manner that was not envisaged by the host state.60 
Herein, foreign investors could incorporate more generous clauses or 
stronger commitments than are found in other treaties.61 This allowed in a 
manner for "treaty shopping" and "free riding", where investors receive 
unearned benefits, which in turn unseats the idea of reciprocal 
concessions.62 The MFN clause therefore had the unintended consequence 
of subverting the will of the contracting parties in a manner that altered the 
substance of the treaty.63 There was therefore a compelling case to omit the 
MFN clause, regardless of its benefits. This is also consistent with the 
                                            
56  Notably, the SADC FIP does not clarify whether MFN treatment is applicable to both 
pre-establishment and post-establishment. This is important as it determines what 
rights are afforded to investors. 
57  PMG 2016 http://pmg.org.za/files/150922summary.pdf. 
58  Flodgren Corporate and Employment Perspectives 70. 
59  Tanzi et al International Investment Law in Latin America 202. 
60  Collins Introduction to International Investment Law 110. 
61  See Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v Sri Lanka ICSID Case No ARB/87/3; Pope and 
Talbot v Canada, UNCITRAL; Maffezini v Spain ICSID Case No ARB/97/7; ADF v 
USA ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/1 of 9 January 2003; Tecmed v Mexico ICSID 
Case No ARB (AF)/00/2 of 29 May 2003; The Loewen Group Inc, Raymond L 
Loewen v The United States of America ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/98/3 26 June 
2003; Yaung Chi Oo (YCO) Trading Pte Ltd v Myanmar ASEAN ID Case No 
ARB/01/1 31 March 2003; MTD v Chile ICSID Case No ARB/01/7 25 May 2004; 
Siemens v Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/02/8 of 3 August 2004. 
62  Collins Introduction to International Investment Law 110. 
63  Dolzer and Schreur Principles of International Investment Law 207. 
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recommendation of the SADC Model BIT that the MFN treaty should not be 
included in a treaty as it has the unintended effect of multilaterisation.64 
Surprisingly, the 2006 SADC FIP did not provide for national treatment, one 
of the most shared standards.65 The national treatment standard provides 
that a host state should not give a foreign investor treatment less favourable 
than that afforded to a domestic investor (in "like circumstances").66 The 
standard, therefore, guards against protectionism by preventing 
discrimination on the basis of nationality.67 While it can be advanced that 
excluding national treatment from the 2006 SADC FIP, as has been done in 
some BITs,68 would allow Member States to be able to regulate issues such 
as labour, health and the environment, this could still be done through 
providing exceptions and qualifications.69 For example, the SADC Model 
BIT70 provides that states can impose special exceptions such as those 
ensuring that foreign investments are legally constituted under domestic 
law.71 Such a provision balances investor protection and the right to 
regulate. 
The 2016 SADC FIP remedies the challenges of the 2006 SADC FIP by 
including a substantive national treatment clause. In addition to defining the 
treatment that should be given,72 the clause further elaborates on what 
constitutes "like circumstances" and furnishes an indicative list of factors to 
consider in deciding the likeness of the circumstances.73 More importantly, 
the national treatment standard in the 2016 SADC FIP has been qualified. 
Article 6(3) of the 2016 SADC FIP provides that notwithstanding the 
                                            
64  Commentary on art 5 of the SADC Model BIT. 
65  Schill International Investment Law 244. 
66  See, for example art 4(2) of the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and 
the Republic of Botswana on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments (1998) (Botswana-Switzerland BIT); art 3(1) of the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Lesotho Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment (with Protocol) (1982) (Lesotho-Germany BIT); art 3(2) of 
the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments (1995) (Swaziland-United Kingdom BIT). Other BITs 
have gone as far as adding the words "like circumstances" to ensure that the national 
treatment can be provided in comparable settings. Also see art 1102 of North 
American Free Trade Agreement (1994) (NAFTA); Van Duzer, Simons and Mayeda 
Integrating Sustainable Development 120; Reinisch Standards of Investment 
Protection 38. 
67  See Salacuse Law of Investment Treaties 274. 
68  Sacerdoti et al General Interests of Host States 405. 
69  Solanes and Jouravlev Revisiting Privatisation 34. 
70  The SADC Model BIT opts to include national treatment rather than MFN treatment. 
71  Article 4(5) of the SADC Model BIT. 
72  Article 6(1) of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
73  See art 6(2) of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
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obligation to provide national treatment, a state party may, in accordance 
with its domestic legislation, grant preferential treatment to domestic 
investors and investments in order to achieve developmental objectives. 
This clause is particularly important given the development needs of 
developing countries as well as the constitutional imperatives and mandates 
of some of the Member States. For example, the Zimbabwean and South 
African Constitutions focus on redressing the injustices of the past by 
empowering previously disenfranchised groups through preferential 
treatment.74 This has been reflected in Zimbabwe's Indigenisation and 
Economic Empowerment Act [Chapter 14: 30] (IEEA) and South Africa's 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (BEE Act).75 
As a result, these countries have incorporated this idea in the drafting of 
their recent treaties. For instance, the 2009 Zimbabwe-South Africa BIT 
provides a qualified national treatment standard.76 This provision inter alia 
notes that a state party shall not be in breach of the national treatment 
obligation if its laws or measures are designed to promote the achievement 
of equality within its territory or are designed to advance or protect persons 
or categories of persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination in its territory.77 It is therefore not surprising that South Africa 
recommended the inclusion of the national treatment provision in the 2016 
                                            
74  See, for example, s 9(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and 
s 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 2013. 
75  The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act [Chapter 14: 30] (IEEA) 
requires all companies to cede 51% of the shareholding of their companies to 
indigenous Zimbabweans. The IEEA also requires that 51% of all the goods 
purchased by the Government in terms of the Procurement Act [Chapter 22: 14] be 
from companies where a controlling interest is held by indigenous Zimbabweans. 
See s 3(1)(a) of the IEEA. See further Statutory Instrument 21 of 2010 in GG 
Extraordinary of 29 January 2010, Statutory Instrument 34 of 2011 in GG 
Extraordinary of 25 March 2011, Statutory Instrument 84 of 2011 in GG 
Extraordinary of 27 July 2011, Statutory Instrument 114 of 2011 in GG Extraordinary 
of 25 March 2011, Statutory Instrument 66 of 2013 in GG of 17 March 2013. The 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (BEE Act) focuses on, 
but is not limited to: "increasing the number of black people that manage, own and 
control enterprises and productive assets; facilitating ownership and management of 
enterprises and productive assets by communities, workers, cooperatives and other 
collective enterprises; human resource and skills development; achieving 
representation in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce; preferential 
procurement and investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by black 
people". See s 1 of the BEE Act. 
76  Article 3 of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
and the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe for the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments (2009). 
77  Article 3(4) of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe for the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments (2009). 
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SADC FIP, which bears a striking resemblance to Article 8 of the South 
African Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015. In addition, the provision 
also draws from Article 4 of the SADC Model BIT on non-discrimination. 
3.2.2  Investor protection 
The protection standards in IIAs are perhaps the standards most keenly 
followed by foreign investors. The reason for this is that investors want to 
ascertain how much protection is available to their investments.78 As a 
result, this section details the various protections that are contained in the 
2016 SADC FIP. These are compared with previous protections under the 
2006 SADC FIP and discussed under the following headings: (1) 
expropriation and compensation (2) fair and equitable treatment and (3) the 
repatriation of funds and transfer of profits. 
3.2.2.1  Expropriation and compensation 
The right to expropriate in customary international law is a jealously guarded 
right.79 Generally, such expropriation should take place in the interest of the 
public or for a public purpose. As noted by Brown, the universal view under 
customary international law is that: 
For expropriation to be lawful, the taking must be made in the public interest, 
on a non-discriminatory basis, under due process of law, and provision must 
be made for prompt, effective and adequate compensation.80 
Over time, this universal view developed into the "Hull doctrine" after a letter 
by Cordell Hull, the then Secretary of State of the United States of 
America,81 to Mexico, detailing that it is accepted practice that expropriation 
must be followed by the payment of "prompt, effective and adequate 
compensation".82 Such compensation had to be complete and paid at a 
market value.83 However, today there is no general consensus as to what 
compensation should be payable.84 It was said in CME v Czech Republic, 
                                            
78  Bosman 2016 https://www.ekon.sun.ac.za/wpapers/2016/wp042016/wp-04-2016. 
pdf. 
79  OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Jordan 2013 102. 
80  Brown Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties 677; Agreement 
between the Republic of Colombia and the Swiss Confederation on the Promotion 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (2006) (Switzerland-Colombia BIT). 
81  Wellhausen Shield of Nationality 201. 
82  Hackworth Digest of International Law 657. 
83  Brown Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties 677. 
84  See ADC v Hungary ICSID Case No ARB/03/16 of 2 October 2006; Germany v 
Poland (1928) PCIJ, Ser A, No 17 of 13 September 1928. 
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however, that despite the divergent views on what compensation is payable, 
full compensation should be paid.85 
The 2006 SADC FIP guaranteed investors a Hull-based protection where 
expropriation is done for a public purpose (or in the public interest). This is 
espoused in Article 5 of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP, which states: 
Investments shall not be nationalised or expropriated in the territory of any 
State party except for a public purpose, under due process of the law, on a 
non-discriminatory basis and subject to the payment of prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation.86 
The approach taken by the 2006 SADC FIP with respect to expropriation 
was consistent with the property clauses in domestic constitutions as well 
as expropriation clauses in the current BITs of the Member States. 
For instance, the new Zimbabwean Constitution provides in section 71(3) 
that persons may be compulsorily deprived of their property only if the 
deprivation is done: "in terms of law of general application; in the interests 
of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health or town 
and country planning; or in order to develop or use that or any other property 
for a purpose beneficial to the community".87 Furthermore, section 71(3)(c) 
requires the acquiring authority to give reasonable notice, pay fair and 
adequate compensation before acquiring the property or within a 
reasonable time after the acquisition, and approach a competent court for a 
confirmation order 30 days before or after the property was acquired, if the 
acquisition is disputed. 
The South African Constitution, as another example, provides in section 25 
that no persons may be arbitrarily deprived of their property unless in terms 
of law of general application.88 When such a law is followed, this must be 
for a public purpose or in the public interest and subject to the payment of 
compensation determined by the affected parties or a court of law. Further, 
the "amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment must be 
just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public 
interests of those affected and all the relevant circumstances".89 
                                            
85  CME v Czech Republic (UNCITRAL) 9 ICSID Reports 121 of 13 September 2001 
para 497. 
86  Article 5 of Annex 1 of the SADC FIP. 
87  Section 71(3)(a)-(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 2013. This 
section provides for protection from expropriation. 
88  Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
89  These circumstances include: "the current use of the property; the history of the 
acquisition and use of the property; the market value of the property; the extent of 
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In both examples, despite the variable language used, expropriation must 
be done in accordance with law of general application. In addition, it must 
be for a public purpose or in the public interest, and prompt, effective and 
adequate compensation must be given. While the expropriation clause in 
the 2006 SADC FIP covered a fair number of the important issues regarding 
expropriation despite its brevity, more detail could have been given. 
The 2016 SADC FIP deals with expropriation and nationalisation in more 
detail and in a slightly different manner.90 Firstly, in terms of compensation, 
the 2016 SADC FIP does not utilise the Hull formula (fair, prompt and 
adequate compensation). Instead it provides that expropriation or 
nationalisation should be done subject to the payment of fair and adequate 
compensation. This is in line with the formulation in Article 6(1) of the SADC 
Model BIT. The provision then goes on to clarify the determination of fair 
and adequate compensation. It notes that: 
Fair and adequate compensation shall be assessed in relation to the fair 
market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the 
expropriation took place ("date of expropriation") and shall not reflect any 
change in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become 
known earlier. However, where appropriate, the assessment of fair and 
adequate compensation shall be based on an equitable balance between the 
public interest and the interest of those affected, having regard to all relevant 
circumstances and taking account of: 
(a) the current and past use of the property; 
(b) the history of its acquisition; 
(c) the fair market value of the investment; 
(d) the purpose of the expropriation; 
(e) the extent of the previous profit made by the foreign investor through 
the investment; and 
(f) the duration of the investment. 
This is consistent with the second proposal by South Africa, that there be 
more flexibility with regards to the valuation of the expropriated 
investment.91 South Africa further proposed that the standard of 
compensation contemplated in section 25 of the South African Constitution 
be applied. A comparison of Article 5 of Appendix 1 of the 2016 SADC Model 
                                            
direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital 
improvement of the property; and the purpose of the expropriation". See s 25(3) of 
the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
90  See art 5 of the 2016 SADC FIP. South Africa's first proposal was more in line with 
option 2 of art 6(2) of the SADC Model BIT. This approach envisages that fair market 
value should be the point of departure when it comes to the quantification of 
compensation, but this should not be the definitive standard. Rather, where possible, 
the host state should be able to use an alternative valuation which is fairer to all 
parties. 
91  PMG 2016 http://pmg.org.za/files/150922summary.pdf. 
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BIT and section 25(3) of the South African Constitution reveals that the 
former is derived from the latter. This is in line with option 1 for Article 6(2) 
of the SADC Model BIT. This approach reflects a sober and more balanced 
approach to determining compensation because it strikes a balance 
between the public interest and the interests of those affected. The reason 
for this is that while there is a presumption that the fair market value will be 
used, a state can still rebut this presumption on the basis of the equitable 
criteria set out in the provision.92 
Second, the 2016 SADC FIP provides for the manner in which the 
compensation must be given. It states that the payment shall be made in a 
freely convertible currency in accordance with the applicable law of the host 
state.93 Third, the investor is given a right under domestic law to challenge 
the expropriation or the valuation of the compensation awarded.94 This can 
be done by means of a judicial review or by means of an independent 
authority. This ensures that an investor's rights to fair administrative action 
are realised.95 
Fourth, and more interestingly, the 2016 SADC FIP notes that where a 
payment is significantly burdensome on a host state, such a state may pay 
the amount due yearly over a 3-year period.96 Alternatively, the investor and 
the host state may agree on a suitable period and interest rate.97 The option 
to stagger the payment for expropriation or nationalisation is crucial in the 
developing country context, where resources may not always be available 
to immediately provide for compensation. 
Lastly, the 2016 SADC FIP addresses the issue of indirect expropriation. It 
provides that where the host state undertakes a measure of general 
application "that is designed and applied to protect and enhance legitimate 
public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, 
it shall not constitute indirect expropriation". This is important because it 
reinforces the crucial right to regulate, which will be discussed in a later 
section. Furthermore, it protects the host state from frivolous and litigious 
suits related to the indirect expropriation of investments owing to a domestic 
                                            
92  Commentary on art 6 of the SADC Model BIT. 
93  Article 5(3) of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
94  Article 5(4) of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
95  This is an important right in some jurisdictions. For instance, South Africa enshrines 
this right in s 33 of the Constitution, while Zimbabwe provides for a similar right in s 
68 of its Constitution. Interestingly the South African Protection of Investment Act 
has a right to fair administrative treatment in place of the fair and equitable treatment 
clause. 
96  Article 5(4) of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
97  Article 5(4) of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
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measure. An interesting case in this regard is the Foresti case in South 
Africa, where the state was sued for a claim under the Italian and 
Luxembourg BITs.98 The specific challenge by the investors was that South 
Africa's application of its BEE policy in terms of the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act resulted in the indirect expropriation of the 
claimant's shares. While the case was later withdrawn by the claimant after 
a resolution was put in place by the state, it highlighted the ability of 
investors to challenge key social and economic development measures 
under traditional investment clauses.99 
3.2.2.2  Fair and equitable treatment 
The fair and equitable treatment standard is a broad standard of protection 
which has attracted a fair amount of controversy.100 It requires that a state 
must provide the investments or return on investments of an investor's fair 
and equitable treatment.101 This in itself is not clear and generally leads to 
broad interpretations. Attempts to narrow the standard have been done in 
some cases by linking it to the international minimum standard, the full 
protection and security standard or customary international law.102 These 
attempts have not been successful, however, as arbitral tribunals continue 
to interpret the provision broadly.103 
The 2006 SADC FIP provided for an "autonomous" fair and equitable 
treatment standard. It briefly stated that "Investments and Investors shall 
enjoy fair and equitable treatment in the territory of any State Party".104 As 
is evident from this provision, there was no clarity on the meaning of fair and 
                                            
98  Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli v Republic of South Africa ICSID Case No 
ARB(AF)/07/1. 
99  See generally Lim Alternative Visions 306. 
100  See Solanes and Jouralev Revisiting Privatisation 34. 
101  Article 7 of the Ghanaian Investment Promotion Act (GN 131 of 2009). According to 
Bonnitcha J, the fair and equitable standard seems to have emerged from art 11(2) 
of the failed Havana Charter of the International Trade Organisation (ITO) (1948), 
which provided for "just and equitable treatment", after which the obligation to 
provide fair and equitable treatment surfaced in FCN Treaties. See Bonnitcha 
Substantive Protection under Investment Treaties 143. 
102  Tudor Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard 66. UNCTAD notes that the linking of 
the fair and equitable treatment standard and the international minimum standard by 
a growing number of studies is without merit. This judgment is reinforced by the 
OECD, which states that fair and equitable treatment does not automatically include 
the international minimum standard. See UNCTAD 2012 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf 23. 
103  Porterfield 2013 https://www.iisd.org/itn/2013/03/22/a-distinction-without-a-
difference-the-interpretation-of-fair-and-equitable-treatment-under-customary-
international-law-by-investment-tribunals/. 
104  Article 6(1) of Annex 1 of the SADC FIP. 
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equitable treatment. This view is reinforced by the Waste Management v 
United Mexican States105 case, where it was noted that "the standard is to 
some extent a flexible one which must be adapted to the circumstances of 
a particular case".106 This then brought to the fore the need to revisit the 
usage of this standard in the SADC FIP. 
A number of options were available for resolving the challenges brought 
about by the fair and equitable treatment standard. These included: (1) 
linking the fair and equitable standard to customary international or the 
international minimum standard, (2) providing an exhaustive list of 
obligations related to fair and equitable treatment, (3) completely eliminating 
the standard of fair and equitable treatment from the treaty, and (4) 
providing an alternative formulation of the fair and equitable treatment such 
as fair administrative treatment.107 
To analyse: the first option is rendered impractical because of the refusal of 
arbitral tribunals to recognise efforts to limit the interpretation of the standard 
in cases such as the Railroad Development Corp v Guatemala.108 Similarly, 
the third option is hamstrung by the frequent desire of states to include the 
fair and equitable treatment standard despite its general weaknesses.109 
The fourth option is more practical as it provides a narrower scope. This is 
the option adopted by South Africa in its Protection of Investment Act. The 
Drafting Committee of the SADC Model BIT was suitably impressed with 
this option, as it narrows the scope of the current fair and equitable 
treatment standard, thereby eliminating the possibility of an expansive 
interpretation. The challenge with this, however, is the shift in the drafting 
language from investor rights to governance standards, which drastically 
lessens the protection that should be granted to an investor according to 
customary international law. In this regard, the alternative formulation of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard becomes too narrow. Furthermore, it 
                                            
105  Waste Management v United Mexican States ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/3. 
106  Waste Management v United Mexican States ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/3 para 
99. This is supported by the averments of Professor Muchlinski on the matter. He 
states that: "[t]he concept of fair and equitable treatment is not precisely defined. It 
offers a point of departure in formulating an argument that the foreign investor has 
not been well treated by reason of discriminatory or other unfair measures being 
taken against its interests. It is, therefore, a concept that depends on the 
interpretation of specific facts for its content. At most, it can be said that the concept 
connotes the principle of non-discrimination and proportionality in the treatment of 
foreign investors". See Muchlinski Multinational Enterprises and the Law 625. 
107  See Leite 2016 Am U Int'l L Rev 397 for other options. 
108  Railroad Development Corp v Guatemala ICSID Case No ARB/07/23. 
109  This is explained by states' wanting to use alternative formulations of the rule so as 
to limit it. 
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can be noted that protection is already given in domestic law as part of 
substantive and procedural fairness.110 This leaves the second option as 
the only practical option. 
The 2016 SADC FIP, however, adopts the more radical third approach. The 
fair and equitable treatment standard is not included in this document. The 
reasoning behind this can be found in the Preamble of the 2016 SADC FIP, 
where the State Parties noted that some of the provisions in the 2006 SADC 
FIP fail to adequately balance investor protection and the host state's need 
for development policy space. The result of this, they noted, was that in their 
previous form some of the provisions could have unintended consequences 
for SADC Member States.111 Despite these novel assertions, it is contended 
that a less restrictive option could have been adopted. It is important that 
the SADC FIP should clearly articulate the need for a transparent and 
predictable regulatory environment which protects investors from arbitrary 
or abusive conduct by a host state through a qualified fair and equitable 
treatment clause.112 Such an approach balances investment protection and 
the competing policy objectives of the host state. 
3.2.2.3  The repatriation of funds and transfer of profits 
One of the cornerstone principles in foreign investment law is that 
investments and their profits should be able to be repatriated.113 Generally, 
investors are not willing to make investments in a foreign country where they 
will be unable to repatriate the profits from the operations or the funds for 
the partial or complete sale of the original investment.114 The same 
sentiment is shared by the government of the country of the investor, which 
also stands to benefit economically from such repatriation.115 The result is 
that most investment treaties contain a clause on how capital and funds will 
be repatriated. 
In the light of the above, the 2006 SADC FIP provided for the free movement 
of capital, subject to restrictions in certain instances.116 It stated that "State 
Parties shall encourage the free movement of capital".117 This was qualified, 
                                            
110  See for example s 33 of the South African Constitution and s 68 of the Zimbabwean 
Constitution. 
111  Preamble of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
112  PMG 2015 http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/150916 
Summary.pdf. 
113  Viterbo International Economic Law and Monetary Issues 244. 
114  Woodbridge Next World War 120. 
115  Muchlinksi, Ortino and Schreuer Oxford Handbook 331. 
116  Article 15 of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP. 
117  Article 15(1) of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP. 
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however, by Article 15(2) of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP, which provided 
that: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, State Parties may regulate 
capital movements subject to their domestic laws and regulations, when 
necessitated by economic constraints.118 
This qualification was important for two reasons. First, it allowed state 
parties the leeway to use domestic laws and policy to counter tough macro-
economic challenges by restricting the transfer of funds which could 
facilitate sustainable economic development. Secondly, it raised a question 
about what would qualify as a genuine economic constraint. This made the 
application of the provision very subjective and prone to abuse. 
The 2016 SADC FIP maintained the core formulation of the 2006 SADC FIP 
in relation to the repatriation of funds. The most significant change in relation 
to this provision was the inclusion of an indicative list of what could qualify 
as economic constraints. This was key because it partially limits the 
possibility of abuse by Member States.  
3.3  The rights and obligations of investors and State Parties 
3.3.1  The right to regulate 
It is trite that a state has the sovereign right to regulate within its borders. 
This is equally true in the context of international investment law. As noted 
in ADC v Hungary, a state has an inherent right to regulate, subject to 
limitations.119 On the matter of this right Salacuse expressed the opinion 
that: 
With respect to foreign investment, states have the complete legislative 
jurisdiction to determine to what extent foreign nationals and companies may 
undertake investments, which sectors and industries they may or may not 
enter, and whether or not they must fulfil additional conditions in order to 
undertake and operate an investment within state territory.120 
As is evidenced above, the right to regulate gives host states autonomy to 
control how investments are regulated within their territories. As a result, 
this is a highly cherished right in international investment law, one which 
states will not give up lightly, as it has important implications for national 
                                            
118  Article 15(2) of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP. 
119  ADC v Hungary ICSID Case No ARB/03/16 of 2 October 2006. 
120  Salacuse Law of Investment Treaties 191; Sornarajah International Law on Foreign 
Investment 311. 
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policy space and regulatory flexibility for development,121 and has public 
welfare implications.122 
Consistent with the need for states to control investments within their 
territories, the 2006 SADC FIP provided for the right to regulate.123 This right 
to regulate could typically be invoked in the interest of the public so as to 
ensure that foreign investments accord with health, safety or environmental 
requirements.124 However, the difficulty was that public interest as a 
regulatory interest was not adequately captured. It is not enough to refer to 
the right to regulate in the public interest, as is often done, as this does not 
narrow the possible meanings of public interest.125 
There have been various ways of trying to give meaning to the right to 
regulate in the public interest. The Preamble of the Protection of Investment 
Act in South Africa, for instance, provides that the government has a right 
to regulate in the interests of the public in accordance with the Constitution. 
While this does little to bring clarity to the meaning and scope of the right to 
regulate in the public interest, it does provide context as to how the right 
should be exercised. 
Another way is to provide an illustrative list of matters generally deemed as 
forming part of the right to regulate in the public interest. A good starting 
point is to observe the matters referred to by Nikièma as forming part of 
public interest. He notes that "public interest is a broad concept that includes 
public order, public health, national security, human rights, public morals 
and environmental protection".126 However, Titi limits the scope of public 
interest in the context of the right to regulate. He believes that "the right to 
regulate in the public interest is understood to encompass regulation with a 
basis other than a state of necessity, national security or the public order".127 
Titi's interpretation is consistent with provisions in recent texts on the right 
to regulate. For example, the Norwegian 2015 Model BIT takes into account 
only matters related to safety, human rights, labour rights, resource 
                                            
121  See generally Alvarez Public International Law Regime 223. 
122  It is important to regulate foreign investment in terms of public welfare, because 
foreign investors might, for example, pollute the air, which would affect the general 
public of the host state. 
123  See art 14 of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP. 
124  Article 14 of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP. 
125  Titi avers that "[a]t a national level the public interest may thus be explained as a 
nation's general welfare and well-being". See Titi Right to Regulate in International 
Investment Law 100. 
126  Nikièma 2012 http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/best_practice_indirect_expropriation.pdf 
3. 
127  Titi Right to Regulate in International Investment Law 100-101. 
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management and environmental concerns when dealing with the right to 
regulate.128 
It is also important to note that the exercise of the right to regulate may result 
in direct or indirect expropriation. For instance, the Tribunal in Desarrollo de 
Santa Elena S.A. v The Republic of Costa Rica129 had to make a 
determination on indirect expropriation and state regulation for the public 
purpose of protecting the environment. In reaching a decision, the tribunal 
noted that despite the fact that the expropriation had been done for the 
legitimate purpose of regulating to protect the environment, this did not 
absolve the government from paying compensation.130 In the words of the 
Tribunal: 
[T]he purpose of protecting the environment for which the Property was taken 
does not alter the legal character of the taking for which adequate 
compensation must be paid. The international source of the obligation to 
protect the environment makes no difference.131 
Therefore, while a state has a right to regulate, the exercise of this right 
comes with the concomitant responsibility to compensate an affected 
investor, where such a measure leads to expropriation.132 It is therefore 
critical that the right to regulate be read with other provisions such as 
national treatment or expropriation and compensation. 
The 2016 SADC FIP expressly provides for the right to regulate in Article 
14. It states that a host state has a "right to regulate in the public interest 
and to adopt, maintain or enforce any measure that it considers appropriate 
to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner that is sensitive 
to health, safety or environmental concerns". The proposal by South Africa 
was, however, that this provision be redefined.133 Its view was that the 
current text had to be replaced by a clearer and more detailed provision. 
The recommended provision reads as follows: 
                                            
128  See art 12 of the Norway Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2015). 
129  Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v The Republic of Costa Rica ICSID Case No. 
ARB/96/1 of 17 February 2000. 
130  Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v The Republic of Costa Rica ICSID Case No. 
ARB/96/1 of 17 February 2000 para 71. The Tribunal noted that the government of 
Costa Rica had a right in international law to expropriate property against the 
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. 
131  Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v The Republic of Costa Rica ICSID Case No. 
ARB/96/1 of 17 February 2000 para 71. 
132  See generally Adeleke 2015 http://www.saiia.org.za/policy-insights/benchmarking-
south-africas-foreign-direct-investment-policy 3. 
133  PMG 2016 http://pmg.org.za/files/150922summary.pdf. 
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In accordance with customary international law and general principles of 
international law, the Host State has the right to take regulatory or other 
measures to ensure that development in its territory is consistent with the 
goals and principles of sustainable development, and with other legitimate 
social and economic policy objectives.134 
This provision crystallises the right to regulate in the public interest of the 
state in international law. This provision by virtue of its drafting also 
eliminates any ambiguity related to the powers of the state to take regulatory 
measures or otherwise to promote the welfare and interests of its people. 
This in turn reduces the possibility for litigation. As a result, the 2016 SADC 
FIP integrates this suggestion verbatim in Article 12(1). Two further 
subsections were added, however. Article 12(2) reinforces the contents of 
Article 12(1) by noting that an exercise of the right to regulate should be 
understood as forming part of the balance of rights and obligations of 
investors and host states. Article 12(3) notes that non-discriminatory 
measures taken in order to comply with international obligations under other 
treaties do not constitute a breach of the 2016 SADC FIP.  
3.3.2  Transparency 
Notwithstanding its declining use,135 the transparency clause remains a 
fundamental feature of the new generations of BITs.136 It generally provides 
that the host state must be transparent in its laws, regulations, 
administrative practices and procedures.137 To meet this requirement the 
government must publish its policies in places such as the Government 
Gazette so as to inform concerned parties of their rights and obligations.138 
The rationale behind these clauses is that "[t]ransparency is a crucial 
determinant of the political and economic risk foreign investors face when 
making a foreign investment decision".139 The difficulty with this approach 
is that it focuses on the state and its institutions but fails to demand the 
                                            
134  PMG 2016 http://pmg.org.za/files/150922summary.pdf. 
135  Houde "Novel Features in Recent OECD Bilateral Investment Treaties" 153. 
136  OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Russian Federation 2006 73; Van den Berg 
International Commercial Arbitration 54. 
137  The United States of America (USA), for example, has strong transparency 
measures which require transparency in host-state measures. See United States of 
America Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2015) (USA 2012 Model BIT). After the 
2004 amendment, NAFTA's art 11 also contains a broad clause on transparency. 
See art 11 of NAFTA; Vandevelde US International Investment Agreements 424. 
138  Nde Fru International Law on Foreign Investments 69. 
139  Rosendorff and Shin 2012 https://wp.nyu.edu/faculty-rosendorff/wp-
content/uploads/sites/1510/2015/03/RosendorffShinAPSA2012.pdf 6. 
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same amount of transparency from all actors, including foreign investors 
and their home states.140 
The 2006 SADC FIP also contained a moderate version of this novel clause. 
Article 8 provides that in order to create confidence, trust and predictability, 
the state parties have to adopt transparent laws and policies related to 
investment.141 This provision, therefore, necessitated that state parties be 
transparent in their laws and policies related to investment. This was 
important because investors generally want to peruse the laws and policies 
of a country before investing. 
The 2016 SADC FIP maintains the transparency provision in the 2006 
SADC FIP as subsection 1 of Article 7. In subsection 2 of the Article, 
however, it obliges Member States who introduce regulations which affect 
the contents of the SADC FIP to notify the SADC Secretariat for information 
3 months before introducing such a regulation. This provision was 
previously contained in Article 15(3) of Annex1 of the 2006 SADC FIP. 
Therefore, there are no significant changes to the transparency clause. 
3.3.3  Sustainable development: the optimal use of natural resources and 
environmental measures 
The optimal use of natural resources is a rarely used clause in the treaty 
system, which accords with the objectives of sustainable development and 
the preservation of the environment.142 A typical clause provides that the 
host state must guarantee that natural resources within its borders are used 
in a manner that is environmentally friendly and sustainable. Some treaties 
would generally prefer to canvass these ideas in separate clauses on 
sustainable development and the environment.  
The 2006 SADC FIP contained an independent clause on the optimal use 
of natural resources.143 It provided that "State Parties shall promote the use 
of their natural resources in a sustainable and environmentally friendly 
manner".144 The 2016 SADC FIP maintains this provision. In the developing 
country context, this is a key provision in ensuring that resources are 
                                            
140  Muchlinski, Ortino and Schreuer Oxford Handbook 627. 
141  Article 8 of Annex 1 if the 2006 SADC FIP. 
142  Albath Trade and Energy 72; Dupy, Francioni and Petersman Human Rights in 
International Investment Law 484; Gazzini Interpretation of International Investment 
Treaties 161. 
143  See art 12 of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP. 
144  Article 12 of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP. 
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optimally utilised. Further revisions should be made to this provision, 
however, so as to adequately link it to sustainable development. 
3.3.4  Key personnel 
Key personal provisions in a treaty regulate how a foreign company can fill 
important vacancies within its structure.145 This provision is vital in 
determining how a foreign enterprise will fill key managerial positions as part 
of its strategic plans.146 This is because these companies are always looking 
to bring expatriates in to take up positions requiring special skills.147 This 
provision is expressed differently in investment treaties. Some of its forms 
include entry and sojourn, key personnel, permits, and the sourcing of 
requisite skills. 
Both the 2006 SADC FIP and the 2016 SADC FIP express their clauses on 
foreign personnel as the "sourcing of requite skills".148 The provision states 
that: 
State Parties shall, subject to their national laws and regulations, permit 
investors to engage key personal and other necessary human resources of 
their choice, regardless of their nationality, under the following circumstances: 
(a) where the skills do not exist in the Host State and the Region, 
(b) where State Parties are satisfied that the sourcing of such skills will 
be in compliance with regional policies; and where such sourcing 
would enhance the development of local capacity through skills 
transfer.149 
While this provision is partially protectionist, it supports the domestic policies 
of the Member States. Most countries now seek to ensure that investments 
benefit their citizens through employment, and as a result, they want to 
ensure that investors bring in only specialised employees who will transfer 
their skills to locals.150 
                                            
145  Caliskan Development of International Investment Law 144. 
146  Collins Introduction to International Investment Law 152. 
147  Houde "Novel Features in Recent OECD Bilateral Investment Treaties" 155. 
148  See art 11 of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP. 
149  Article 11 of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP. 
150  Xenophobic tendencies in countries such as South Africa, Botswana and Namibia 
are also good reasons for this provision. If investors are not restricted in bringing in 
foreign employees, locals may start to feel as though the expatriates are taking over 
their jobs. 
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3.3.5  Corporate responsibility 
The clause on CSR has recently surfaced in international investment 
agreements.151 In this regard some Model BITs have made specific 
reference to CSR.152 These include the 2007 Norway Draft Model BIT, the 
2012 Canadian Model BIT, and more recently the 2015 Indian Model BIT 
and the 2015 Norway Model BIT. To focus on the 2015 Norway model BIT, 
this document emphasises the importance of CSR in its preamble.153 Article 
31 provides that: 
The Parties agree to encourage investors to conduct their investment activities 
in compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and to participate in the 
United Nations Global Compact.154 
The CSR clause, therefore, is important in promoting the social, ethical, 
human rights and environmental obligations of investors beyond their legal 
and economic duties.155 This moves away from the current practice of 
asking for voluntary compliance with CSR standards and imposes a duty of 
discharging CSR.156 As argued by Pillay, a CSR clause is vital, particularly 
for developing countries, as it promotes their "power to regulate to achieve 
sustainable development".157 
Article 10 of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP provided for corporate 
responsibility. It states that "[f]oreign investors shall abide by the laws, 
regulations, administrative guidelines and policies of the Host State".158 The 
language of this provision is retained in the 2016 SADC FIP with reference 
to investor responsibility. The challenge with this drafting is that it focuses 
on compliance with domestic laws and procedures but does not require the 
investor or the investment to comply with international standards or to 
participate in international bodies, as is required by the CSR clause in the 
2015 Norway model BIT, for example. There is therefore a need to clarify 
the corporate responsibility clause in the SADC FIP so as to shift its 
emphasis from the current specific compliance with law and policy to a 
broader and more general compliance. 
                                            
151  Bjorklund Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 433. 
152  Sauvant Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 600. 
153  Preamble of the 2015 Norway Model BIT. 
154  Article 31 of the 2015 Norway Model BIT. 
155  See Mallin Corporate Social Responsibility 129. 
156  Titi Right to Regulate in International Investment Law 110. 
157  Pillay Changing Nature of Corporate Social Responsibility 197. 
158  Article 10 of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP. 
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3.4  General provisions 
3.4.1  Exceptions 
A small but growing number of international investment agreements, 
particularly free trade agreements (FTAs), contain exception clauses.159 In 
most instances, a treaty will contain an exception clause related to either 
Article XX of the GATT or Article XIV of the GATS. However, in some cases, 
a hybrid exception clause is provided.160 Beyond the differences in 
formulation, the purpose of these clauses is to increase regulatory flexibility, 
balance the interests of investors and host states, and enhance legal 
certainty where disputes arise. 
Exceptions in a treaty can be either general or special. General exceptions 
apply to all the obligations in a treaty, while special exceptions apply to 
certain obligations only. On the one hand, special exceptions usually focus 
on national treatment and MFN treatment, while on the other hand, general 
exceptions cover issues161 such as human rights, public order, public 
employment, labour standards, the environment, taxation and security.162 
Recently the trend in international investment agreements has been to 
include special exceptions. The SADC FIP does not deviate from this norm. 
The 2006 SADC FIP allowed for special exceptions to the application of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard and MFN treatment. The implications 
of these exceptions were that the state could grant differential treatment to 
investors. For instance, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the 2006 SADC FIP, a 
state party could "grant preferential treatment to qualifying investments and 
investors in order to achieve national development objectives".163 
                                            
159  See Newcombe and Paradell Law and Practice of Investment Treaties 500; Desierto 
Public Policy in International Economic Law 327. 
160  Sabanogullari 2015 https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/05/21/the-merits-and-limitations-
of-general-exception-clauses-in-contemporary-investment-treaty-practice/. 
161  Vandevelde classifies the issues treated in general exceptions into four main areas, 
namely: "the security of the state against external threats or internal disorder, the 
preservation and protection of life (including the physical environment that makes 
life possible), the regulation of the economy, and the preservation of diverse 
cultures". See Vandevelde 2013 LCLR 450. 
162  It is argued that in new generation BITs, exceptions related to public order and 
security have fallen away in favour of security exceptions related to the regulation of 
financial services, the preservation of culture and industries and the protection of 
health, safety and the environment. See Nhamo and Chekwoti Land Grabs in a 
Green Economy 49. 
163  Article 7(1) of Annex 1 of 2006 the SADC FIP. 
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The 2016 SADC FIP does not contain an exceptions clause. Neither does 
it contain an MFN clause or the fair and equitable treatment standard. 
Rather, it provides a national treatment clause with built-in exceptions. It 
provides that host states may grant "preferential treatment to domestic 
investments and investors in order to achieve national development 
objectives".164 These exceptions, as discussed earlier, are crucial to 
ensuring that the right to regulate is not unnecessarily impeded. 
3.5  Dispute resolution 
With the constant evolution of international investment law, which brings 
about uncertainty, dispute resolution has become a fundamental area in 
treaties. Dispute settlement mechanisms permit an investor to initiate 
proceedings against a host-state in domestic and international forums.165 
Internationally, the fora available to the investor include the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Disputes (ICSID) and the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Each of these 
institutions has its own rules and arbitral tribunals.166 
Dispute resolution clauses, in particular investor-state arbitration provisions, 
have been at the centre of much controversy, as they have exposed many 
developing states to heavy penalties for breaching investment 
agreements.167 For example, in 2012 an investor from the USA was 
awarded almost US$ 1.9 billion for a claim against Ecuador.168 Zimbabwe, 
for one, has lost arbitral proceedings at the ICSID and SADC Tribunals.169 
Such losses have led to a growing movement for the provision of non-
binding investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms. This has been 
embraced mostly in investment chapters in FTAs, with the exception of 
some BITs such as those of Australia.170 While BITs focus on both investor-
state arbitration and state-state arbitration, FTAs and their investment 
chapters focus on investor-state arbitration, which is viewed as being more 
                                            
164  Article 6(3) of the 2017 SADC FIP. 
165  Schill International Investment Law 13. 
166  See the International Centre for Settlement of Disputes Convention (1965) and the 
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Tribunal Awards (1958) (New York Convention). 
167  Van Duzer, Simons and Mayeda Integrating Sustainable Development 411. 
168  Ocidental Petroleum v Ecuador ICSID Case No ARB06/11 of 5 October 2012. 
169  See, for example, Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v Republic of Zimbabwe 2008 SADCT 2 
of 28 November 2008; Bernadus Henricus Funnekotter v Republic of Zimbabwe 
ICSID Case No ARB/05/06; and Bernhard von Pezold v Republic of Zimbabwe 
ICSID Case No ARB/1/15. 
170  Bjorklund and Reinisch International Investment Law 218. 
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pertinent in such agreements.171 This is problematic as it closes the avenue 
to state-state dispute resolution where the state is an interested party. 
For the above reasons, the 2006 SADC FIP only provided for investor-state 
arbitration. Article 28 on the settlement of disputes provided that if a dispute 
was not satisfactorily resolved after 6 months of a notice of claim and all 
local remedies had been exhausted, a party could submit the dispute for 
international arbitration.172 The fora available to the investor in terms of this 
provision were the SADC Tribunal, the ICSID, and an international arbitrator 
or ad hoc arbitral tribunal established pursuant to a special agreement or 
constituted in terms of the New York Convention rules.173 In addition to this, 
investors were also granted in Article 27 access to domestic courts, judicial 
and administrative tribunals, or other competent authorities which could 
redress the grievances of the investor. 
The 2016 SADC FIP maintains access to domestic courts and tribunals for 
investors in Article 25. However, in Article 26 it makes a hard exit from 
investor-state arbitration. It provides that any dispute between state parties 
will be resolved in the manner provided for under the Protocol of the 
Tribunal. Effectively, this means that the 2016 SADC FIP deals with state-
state arbitration only. This is in line with the proposal by South Africa that 
Article 28 of the 2006 SADC FIP be removed as a result of concerns with 
the settlement of investor-state disputes by international tribunals. These 
concerns included inter alia the "perceived lack of transparency and 
legitimacy of the international arbitration process, conflicting arbitral 
jurisprudence, the independence of arbitrators and the prohibitive legal 
costs associated with international commercial arbitration and excessive 
damages".174 
Second, the inclusion of the toothless SADC Tribunal as an arbitral body is 
problematic. This is because the legitimacy of this body is questionable. The 
SADC Tribunal became defunct after the case of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v 
Republic of Zimbabwe,175 where Zimbabwe refused to abide by the decision 
of the tribunal after being found in breach of its obligations under the SADC 
Treaty. More specifically, the state had unlawfully expropriated private 
property without compensation. Zimbabwe cited the illegitimacy of the 
                                            
171  See Pryles Dispute Resolution in Asia 107; Hamilton et al Latin American Investment 
Protection 589. 
172  Article 28(1) of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP. 
173  Article 28(2) of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP. 
174  PMG 2016 http://pmg.org.za/files/150922summary.pdf. 
175  Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v Republic of Zimbabwe 2008 SADCT 2 of 28 November 
2008. 
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Tribunal as one of its grounds for non-compliance176 and exerted political 
pressure which led to the suspension of the SADC Tribunal.177 Following 
this process, the SADC leaders, through the SADC Summit, reviewed the 
powers of the tribunal, opting for granting it a more limited scope. One may 
question the efficacy of attempting to rely on an arbitral tribunal that has 
been branded as illegitimate. It would perhaps be better to err on the side 
of caution and focus on the UNCITRAL and ICSID tribunals, which are 
generally viewed as legitimate and competent bodies. 
4  Conclusion 
The changes made in the 2016 SADC FIP are commendable to a great 
degree. In its previous form, it provided antiquated provisions which are 
typical of first-generation BITs. These provisions failed to balance the rights 
and obligations of investors and state parties. Furthermore, the provisions 
exposed host states to onerous investment arbitration claims. The 2016 
SADC FIP addresses most of these concerns by drawing from some South 
African recommendations, the SADC Model BIT, and some international 
best practices. 
The 2016 SADC FIP eliminates problematic clauses such as the fair and 
equitable treatment clause, which is a "cure it all" remedy for investors, and 
the MFN clause, which leads to treaty shopping by investors. The 2016 
SADC FIP also clarified other provisions such as those on the repatriation 
of funds and expropriation. There is now greater certainty with regards to 
these provisions. For example, a proper procedure is laid out for calculating 
the compensation due to an investor. More importantly, the 2016 SADC FIP 
introduced a qualified national treatment clause which allows host states to 
afford preferential treatment to their nationals in line with their 
developmental objectives. This is vital in the developing country context and 
it also accords with the constitutional mandates to redress injustices of the 
past in Member States such as Zimbabwe and South Africa. The 2016 
SADC FIP also restricted the scope of an investment by shifting from an 
open-list asset-based definition to an enterprise-based definition. This 
ensures that only assets related to the enterprise are covered by the 
agreement. 
                                            
176  The North Gauteng High Court in South Africa registered the ruling in South Africa 
and permitted the farmers to attach Zimbabwe's property in South Africa. The 
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See Ndlovhu 2011 LDD 69. 
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However, seven issues still need to be addressed, some of these arising 
from the changes to the 2006 SADC FIP. These relate to: (1) the definition 
of investors, (2) the omission of the fair and equitable treatment standard, 
(3) the scope of the transparency clause, (4) the alignment of the optimal 
use of natural resources clause with sustainable development, (5) the shift 
away from investor-state arbitration, (6) the expansion of the investor liability 
clause, and (7) the inclusion of a physical security clause.  
The definition of investors 
The definition of an investor was narrowed from including any person who 
has been admitted to make an investment so that it now refers only to "a 
natural or a juridical person of another State Party, in accordance with the 
laws and regulations of the State Party in which the investment is made".178 
This limits the protection offered to SADC investors only. This is 
problematic, given the fact that there are very few intra-SADC investments. 
Protection is therefore no longer extended to the SADC's main investors. 
Furthermore, the definition of investors in the 2016 SADC FIP still does not 
address the issue of investors with dual nationalities or companies that are 
effectively managed in other jurisdictions. The 2016 SADC FIP could 
perhaps emulate the SADC Model BIT, which resolves these issues. On the 
matter of dual citizenship, the SADC Model BIT proposes that a natural 
person would be given protection under a treaty only if he/she was 
predominantly resident in the host state.179 As regards the issue of effective 
management, the SADC Model BIT proposes that a juridical person should 
be legally incorporated in the host state, effectively owned or controlled by 
a natural person in the host state, and should have substantial business in 
the host state.180 As regards the scope of the definition, it would be useful 
to revert to the definition contained in the 2006 SADC FIP on the condition 
that disputes between a member state and an investor will be in accordance 
with the law of such a member. 
                                            
178  Article 2 of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
179  Article 2 of the SADC Model BIT. 
180  Despite these inherent weaknesses, the definition of an investor is meritable as it 
does not limit investors to those in a particular geographic region, such as SADC 
members, as is done in the CCIA. See Claypoole 2013 
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The omission of the fair and equitable treatment standard 
In terms of the fair and equitable treatment standard, a more viable 
approach would have been to provide an exhaustive list qualifying the fair 
and equitable treatment standard so as to limit its application. A preferred 
formulation is one stipulated in the Canada Comprehensive Economic 
Trade Agreement (CETA), which provides that: 
A Party breaches the obligation of fair and equitable treatment referenced in 
paragraph 1 where a measure or series of measures constitutes: (a) Denial of 
justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; (b) Fundamental breach 
of due process, including a fundamental breach of transparency, in judicial 
and administrative proceedings. (c) Manifest arbitrariness; (d) Targeted 
discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race or 
religious belief; (e) Abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress 
and harassment; or (f) A breach of any further elements of the fair and 
equitable treatment obligation adopted by the Parties in accordance with 
paragraph 3 of this Article.181 
The closed nature of this list eliminates the possibility of a broad 
interpretation by arbitral tribunals. It also curbs the need for non-compliance 
by some Member States in an effort to avoid the broad provisions of the 
standard.182 Furthermore, it could also be stipulated that the exercise of the 
right to regulate in the public interest does not constitute a breach of the fair 
and equitable treatment standard. This would further mitigate the risks host 
states face from broad interpretations of the standard. It would also facilitate 
transformational policies which could be deemed as violating the fair and 
equitable treatment standard. 
The scope of the transparency clause 
With regards to the transparency provision, the recommendation is that in 
the interest of progressiveness the provision on transparency in the 2016 
SADC FIP should be extended to investors and their home states. The 
SADC Model BIT already extends the obligation of transparency to investors 
and host states in terms of contracts and payments.183 
                                            
181  Article 9 of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (2016) 
(CETA). 
182  South Africa, for one, has deliberately excluded the fair and equitable treatment 
clause in its domestic regulation.  
183  Article 18 of the SADC Model BIT.  
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The alignment of the optimal use of natural resources clause to sustainable 
development 
In terms of the optimal use of natural resources clause, it is recommended 
that this provision be aligned to sustainable development. This is due to the 
interconnectedness of sustainable development, environmental 
measures184 and the use of natural resources. It is recommended that these 
clauses be consolidated in one clause on sustainable development, which 
is an important thrust in modern international investment law. The provision 
would read that:185 
(a) State Parties should promote the use of their natural 
resources in a manner that promotes sustainable 
development. 
(b) More broadly, Member States should take measures to 
protect the environment, human rights, safety, health 
and labour rights, pursuant to their right to regulate, the 
measures of which cannot be relaxed to promote foreign 
investment. 
This provision would clearly articulate the wish of the Member States to use 
BITs to promote investment, but such development ought to be sustainable.  
The shift away from investor-state arbitration 
While the shift away from investor-state arbitration eases the concerns of 
host states with regard to unreasonable arbitral awards, it raises new 
concerns about the adequacy of the recourse mechanism available to 
SADC investors.186 The SADC Tribunal, which is now the main mechanism 
for resolving investment disputes in the SADC, has in the past failed to 
enforce its judgements. Furthermore, while investors retain their right to 
access domestic courts, it is worth noting that domestic courts are subject 
                                            
184  Article 13 of Annex of the SADC FIP on environmental measures provides that: 
"State Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing 
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Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe for the Promotion and Reciprocal 
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to the influence of the host state and can therefore lack impartiality. As a 
result, the mechanisms for resolving disputes are currently inadequate. The 
suggestion is that investor-state arbitration be made an option of last resort 
after all domestic avenues have been exhausted. 
Expansion of the investor liability clause (CSR) 
Another provision that needs revision is the investor liability clause. While 
this provision is noble in that it places an obligation on investors to comply 
with domestic rules and regulations, it is too narrow. The suggestion in this 
regard is that the clause should be extended to include requiring investors 
to act in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights and to participate in the United Nations Global Compact. 
The inclusion of a physical security clause 
One final issue that was not addressed in the amendment is the introduction 
of a full protection and security clause framed as "physical security". Both 
the 2016 SADC FIP and the 2006 SADC FIP do not include this provision, 
which is essential to guarantee the protection of intra-SADC investments in 
times of strife or violence. The failure to include this provision suggests that 
lesser protection is given to intra-SADC investors than would be given to 
other investors under BITs. 
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